In a FCRA putative class action, a Washington federal court quashed a deposition notice for a defendant–company’s litigation support specialist based in the legal department. The court treated her as the General Counsel’s agent for privilege purposes, and used the Shelton doctrine to preclude her deposition testimony. Broyles v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 2017 WL 2256773 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2017). You may read the decision here.
What is a Litigation Support Specialist?
I suppose the duties of a Litigation Support Specialist vary from company to company, but likely include general paralegal duties and/or e-discovery duties. In Broyles, Alisia Stephens worked as a Litigation Support Specialist for Convergent Outsourcing, a collection agency, under the direction of Convergent’s General Counsel. Her duties included reviewing complaints, investigating the complaint’s allegations, and engaging in settlement-related communications with plaintiffs’ counsel before retaining outside counsel.
After Plaintiff Broyles filed her complaint, Stephens communicated with Broyles’ counsel regarding a potential settlement. She also submitted a sworn declaration discussing Broyles’ prior bankruptcy filings and stating, simply, that Convergent’s collection inquiries “were permissible under the FCRA.” Ok, if you say so.
The Deposition More…
In an employment-discrimination case, the SDNY ruled that the attorney–client privilege precluded depositions of a company’s Termination Review Committee members, which included an in-house lawyer. The privilege applied even though the Committee included two non-lawyers. Fletcher v. ABM Building Value, 2017 WL 1536059 (SDNY Apr. 18, 2017). You may read the decision here.
ABM Building Value maintains a committee—ominously named the “Termination Review Committee”—that evaluates managers’ employee-termination decisions before the company carries out a termination. Following its review, the TRC, composed of one in-house lawyer and two non-lawyers, provides the company with advice concerning any risks associated with the termination. More…
Situations arise where a party files privileged communications to support a dispositive motion. But filing privileged documents raises waiver concerns, so the filing party seeks to seal those documents to prevent third-party access. The question arises whether policies underlying the attorney–client privilege overcome citizens’ common-law and First Amendment rights of access to publicly filed documents.
In Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Munich Reinsurance Am., Inc., 2017 WL 1653608 (NDNY Apr. 26, 2017), available here, the USDC NDNY indicated that the privilege is a “higher value” that may rebut the common-law and FA presumption of access. So, the court sealed the privileged communications, right? More…